עַד שֶׁיִּפְרוֹט לְךָ הַכָּתוּב ״יַחְדָּו״.

unless the verse specifies that one is liable only where he curses both together, which it does not do in this case.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי יֹאשִׁיָּה, לְחַלֵּק הָכָא לָא צָרִיךְ. מַאי טַעְמָא – סְבָרָא הוּא: מָה לִי קַטְלַהּ כּוּלָּהּ, מָה לִי קַטְלַהּ פַּלְגָא.

The Gemara answers: You can even say that Rabbi Natan’s derivation from the word “or” is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, as here, in the verse concerning a borrower’s liability, there is no need for the word “or” to divide the cases. What is the reason? The fact that injury and death are alone sufficient to engender liability is based on logical reasoning, as follows: What difference does it make to me if it is entirely killed, and what difference does it make to me if it is partially killed, i.e., injured? Either way, the animal is not in the state in which it was borrowed, so the borrower is liable to compensate the owner.

גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה בְּשׁוֹאֵל מְנָא לַן?

§ The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss?

וְכִי תֵּימָא: נֵילַף מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, מָה לִשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר לְמִיטְרַח וְאֵתוֹיֵי, תֹּאמַר בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּאֶפְשָׁר לְמִיטְרַח וְאֵתוֹיֵי!

And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower is liable if the animal entrusted to him was injured or died, because theft and loss are similar to injury and death in that they are cases of accidents, this derivation can be refuted. What is notable about a case where the animal was injured or died? It is notable in that it is no longer possible to make an effort and bring the animal back to its undamaged state, and so it is reasonable that the borrower is liable for such occurrences. Shall you also say this ruling about a case of theft or loss, where it is still possible to make an effort to locate and bring back the animal? Since the animal is still extant, perhaps the borrower should not be liable.

אֶלָּא כִּי הָא דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְנִשְׁבַּר אוֹ מֵת״, אֵין לִי אֶלָּא שְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה. גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה מִנַּיִן? אָמַרְתָּ קַל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר שֶׁפָּטוּר מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, חַיָּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה. שׁוֹאֵל שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּגְנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה? וְזֶה הוּא קַל וָחוֹמֶר שֶׁאֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה.

Rather, a borrower’s liability for theft and loss is derived like that which is taught in a baraita: From the verse: “And it is injured or dies” (Exodus 22:13), I have derived only that a borrower is liable if the animal is injured or dies. From where do I derive that he is liable in a case of theft or loss? You can say it is an a fortiori inference: If a paid bailee, who is exempt from liability in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, is nevertheless liable in a case of theft or loss, then with regard to a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies, isn’t it logical that he should also be liable in a case of theft or loss? And this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation.

מַאי ״אֵין עָלָיו תְּשׁוּבָה״? וְכִי תֵּימָא: אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ, מָה לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – שֶׁכֵּן מְשַׁלֵּם תַּשְׁלוּמֵי כֶפֶל בְּטוֹעֵן טַעֲנַת לִסְטִים מְזוּיָּין,

The Gemara asks: What is added by the conclusion of the baraita that this is an a fortiori inference that has no refutation? The Gemara explains that the baraita anticipated the following rebuttal: And if you would say that the a fortiori inference can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he pays the double payment when he takes a false oath stating the claim that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit. If so, can you derive a halakha from the case of a paid bailee to that of a borrower, who pays only the principal in such a case? It would appear that a borrower does not always bear a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is thereby undermined.

אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי קַרְנָא דְּשׁוֹאֵל עֲדִיפָא.

Anticipating this refutation, the baraita states that it is invalid because even so, the fact that a borrower is liable to pay the principal when he claims the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, without the ability to exempt himself by taking an oath, is a greater stringency than the fact that a paid bailee is liable for the double payment, but only if he takes a false oath to that effect. Consequently, a borrower has a more severe level of liability, and the a fortiori inference is valid.

אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: קָסָבַר לִסְטִים מְזוּיָּין גַּזְלָן הוּא.

Alternatively, if you wish, say that the baraita holds that an armed bandit is classified as a robber. The paid bailee is not liable for the double payment if he claims that the deposit was taken by an armed bandit, as the double payment is paid only for a false claim of theft, not robbery. Consequently, the basis of the refutation is flawed.

אַשְׁכְּחַן לְחִיּוּב, לִפְטוּר מְנָא לַן?

The Gemara asks: We have found sources for the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss; from where do we derive a source for the halakha that in a case of theft or loss he is exempt if he had also borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as borrowing the animal? The verse describing his exemption from liability is stated only with regard to a case in which the animal entrusted to him is injured or dies (see Exodus 22:13).

וְכִי תֵּימָא נֵילַף מִשְּׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, מָה לִשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה – שֶׁכֵּן אוֹנֶס!

And if you would say: Let us derive it from the fact that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies, as the type of occurrence should not make any difference, then one can counter: What is notable about a case in which it is injured or dies? It is notable in that it is an unavoidable accident, and so it is reasonable that one’s liability be limited. Can you say the same in a case of theft or loss, which theoretically he could have prevented?

אֶלָּא גָּמַר מִשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר. וְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר גּוּפֵיהּ מְנָלַן? גָּמְרִי חִיּוּבָא דְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר מֵחִיּוּבָא דְּשׁוֹאֵל: מָה לְהַלָּן בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר, אַף כָּאן בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר.

Rather, derive the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies from the halakha of a paid bailee, who is exempt for theft and loss if he had borrowed the services of the owner at the same time as the animal. The Gemara asks: But from where do we derive that the exemption from liability also applies to a paid bailee himself? We derive the limitation of liability of a paid bailee from the limitation of liability of a borrower: Just as below, with regard to a borrower, for those cases in which the verse states that he is liable, it states that if he borrowed the animal together with the services of the owner that he is exempt, so too, here, with regard to a paid bailee, for those cases in which he is liable, if he undertook to safeguard the animal together with borrowing the services of the owner, then he is exempt.

בְּמַאי גָּמַר? אִי בַּמָּה מָצִינוּ, אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ כִּדְפָרְכִינַן: שֶׁכֵּן אוֹנֶס!

The Gemara asks: Through what method is this derived? If it is derived through an interpretive principle known as: What do we find, i.e., a comparison between cases with similar details, this can be refuted, just as we refuted the possibility of deriving a limitation on one’s liability in a case of theft or loss from a case in which the animal was injured or died. Because a case in which it is injured or dies is an unavoidable accident, it is reasonable that one’s liability be limited specifically to such circumstances.

אֶלָּא, אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל״ – וָיו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן, וְיִלְמַד עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן.

Rather, the halakha that a bailee who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is stolen or lost is derived as follows: The verse states: “And if he borrows” (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive “and” indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower is adding to the first matter, i.e., it should be seen as a continuation of the previous passage detailing the liability of a paid bailee. And therefore, let the case of a paid bailee above be derived from the case below of the borrower, including the exemption from liability in a case in which the services of the owner were borrowed at the same time as the animal.

וְאַכַּתִּי שׁוֹאֵל מִשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר לָא גָּמַר, דְּאִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – שֶׁכֵּן פָּטוּר בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה, תֹּאמַר בְּשׁוֹאֵל שֶׁחַיָּיב בִּשְׁבוּרָה וּמֵתָה!

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But still, the halakhot of a borrower cannot be derived from those of a paid bailee though an a fortiori inference, as an attempt to do so can be refuted as follows: What is notable about the case of a paid bailee? It is notable in that he is exempt in a case in which the animal is injured or died. Shall you also say the same for a borrower, who is liable in a case in which the animal is injured or dies? Since a borrower has a more severe level of liability, perhaps the exemption from liability that exists in a case of theft or loss for a paid bailee is not in effect with regard to a borrower.

אֶלָּא גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה בְּשׁוֹאֵל לְחִיּוּבָא מְנָלַן – דְּגָמַר מִשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר: דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מָה גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר, אַף גְּנֵיבָה וַאֲבֵידָה דְּשׁוֹאֵל נָמֵי בִּבְעָלִים – פָּטוּר.

Rather, the halakha that a borrower who also borrowed the services of the owner is exempt if the animal is injured or dies is derived as follows: From where did we originally derive the liability of a borrower in a case of theft or loss? It was derived though an a fortiori inference from the fact that a paid bailee is liable. One of the principles of an a fortiori inference is that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. In other words, a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived. Accordingly, just as in a case of theft or loss of a deposit entrusted with a paid bailee who undertook to look after it together with borrowing the services of its owner, the bailee is exempt, so too, in a case of theft or loss of a deposit entrusted with a borrower who had borrowed it together with the services of its owner, the borrower is exempt.

הָנִיחָא לְמַאן דְּאִית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ, אֶלָּא לְמַאן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ דַּיּוֹ מַאי אִיכָּא לְמֵימַר?

The Gemara asks: This works out well according to the one who accepts the principle of: It is sufficient. But according to the one who does not accept the principle of: It is sufficient, what can be said; how does he derive a borrower’s exemption from liability in a case in which he borrowed an item together with its owner’s services and the item was lost or stolen?

אֶלָּא אָמַר קְרָא ״וְכִי יִשְׁאַל״, וָיו מוֹסִיף עַל עִנְיָן רִאשׁוֹן, וְיִלְמַד עֶלְיוֹן מִתַּחְתּוֹן וְתַחְתּוֹן מֵעֶלְיוֹן.

Rather, it is derived as follows: The verse states: “And if he borrows” (Exodus 22:13). The conjunctive “and” indicates that the passage detailing the liability of a borrower is adding to the first matter, i.e., the halakhot of a paid bailee. And therefore let the case of a paid bailee above be derived from the case below of the borrower, and halakhot applying to the case below, of a borrower, can be derived from the case above, of a paid bailee.

אִיתְּמַר: פְּשִׁיעָה בִּבְעָלִים, פְּלִיגִי בַּהּ רַב אַחָא וְרָבִינָא. חַד אָמַר: חַיָּיב, וְחַד אָמַר: פָּטוּר.

§ An amoraic dispute was stated: With regard to a mishap that occurred due to a borrower’s negligence in safeguarding the deposit he borrowed together with the services of its owner, Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree. One Sage says he is liable, and one Sage says he is exempt.

מַאן דְּאָמַר חַיָּיב, קָסָבַר: מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ לְפָנָיו, וְלֹא לִפְנֵי פָנָיו,

The one who says he is liable holds that the verse beginning: “And if he borrows,” which details the exemption from liability when one borrows an item together with its owner, is expounded in connection with the passage preceding it, i.e., that of a paid bailee, but not in connection with the passage preceding the one preceding it, i.e., that of a unpaid bailee.

הִלְכָּךְ ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ אַשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לָא כְּתִיב, וּפְשִׁיעָה נָמֵי בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וּבְשׁוֹאֵל לָא כְּתִיב. הִלְכָּךְ, בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וּבְשׁוֹאֵל לְחִיּוּב אָתְיָא בְּקַל וָחוֹמֶר מִשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם.

Accordingly, the verse: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay” (Exodus 22:14), which appears in the passage of a borrower, is not written in reference to an unpaid bailee, and so that exemption from liability does not apply to him. And in addition, the liability for negligence, which appears in the passage of an unpaid bailee, is not written in reference to a paid bailee or a borrower. Accordingly, the liability of a paid bailee and of a borrower in a case of negligence is derived only via an a fortiori inference from the liability of an unpaid bailee, not from an explicit verse.

אֲבָל בִּבְעָלִים לִפְטוּר אַף בְּשׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר וּבְשׁוֹאֵל – לָא. מַאי טַעְמָא: כִּי כְּתִיב ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ לֹא יְשַׁלֵּם״ אַשּׁוֹאֵל וְאַשּׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר – אַהָנָךְ חִיּוּבֵי דִּכְתִיב בְּהוּ בְּהֶדְיָא הוּא דְּמִיכְּתִב.

But it is not possible to derive that even a paid bailee and a borrower are exempt in cases where they took hold of an item together with borrowing the services of its owner and a mishap occurred due to their negligence. What is the reason for this? When it is written: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay,” that is in reference only to a borrower and to a paid bailee. Even then, it is written in reference to only those liabilities that are written explicitly with regard to them. It is not written with regard to their liability for negligence, which is derived only through an a fortiori inference. Consequently, the borrower and the paid bailee are liable for negligence even in a case where they also borrowed the services of its owner.

מַאן דְּאָמַר פָּטוּר, קָסָבַר: מִקְרָא נִדְרָשׁ לְפָנָיו וְלִפְנֵי פָנָיו, וְכִי כְּתִיב ״אִם בְּעָלָיו עִמּוֹ״ – אַשּׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם נָמֵי כְּתִיב.

Conversely, the one who says that a borrower is exempt holds that the verse: “And if he borrows,” which details the exemption from liability in a case where one borrows an item together with the services of its owner, is expounded in connection with the passage preceding it, i.e., that of a paid bailee, and also in connection with the passage preceding the one preceding it, i.e., that of a unpaid bailee. And accordingly, when it is written: “If its owner is with him, he does not pay,” this exemption is written also in reference to an unpaid bailee, limiting his liability even in a case of negligence.

תְּנַן: הַשּׁוֹאֵל הַפָּרָה וְשָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, הַשּׁוֹאֵל הַפָּרָה וְשָׂכַר בְּעָלֶיהָ עִמָּהּ, שָׁאַל בְּעָלֶיהָ אוֹ שְׂכָרָן וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁאַל הַפָּרָה וּמֵתָה – פָּטוּר. וְאִילּוּ שׁוֹמֵר חִנָּם לָא קָתָנֵי!

The Gemara suggests proofs for each opinion: We learned in the mishna that in the case of one who borrowed a cow and he borrowed the services of its owner together with it; or one who borrowed a cow and he hired its owner with it; or if one borrowed the services of the owner or hired him and afterward borrowed the cow; in all such cases, if the cow died, the borrower is exempt. The Gemara explains the proof: The mishna mentions the exemption from liability with regard to a borrower, whereas it does not teach it with regard to an unpaid bailee, who is liable only for a mishap that was the result of his negligence. Presumably, this is because exemption from liability does not apply to a mishap that is the result of the bailee’s negligence.

וּלְטַעְמָיךְ: שׁוֹמֵר שָׂכָר מִי קָתָנֵי?

The Gemara rejects the proof: But even according to your reasoning, does it teach exemption from liability with regard to a paid bailee? It does not, although it certainly applies to at least cases of theft and loss.

אֶלָּא תַּנָּא, מִילְּתָא

Rather, with regard to the tanna of the mishna, the matter