אִיתָא לִדְרַב הוּנָא כֵּיוָן דְּמִשְׁתְּבַע מִלְוֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, הֵיכִי מָצֵי מַפֵּיק לַהּ? אָמַר רָבָא: שֶׁיֵּשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁנִּשְׂרְפָה.

the statement of Rav Huna is so, once the creditor takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, how can he produce it thereafter? Rava said: The mishna is referring to a case where there are witnesses that the collateral was burned. Therefore, the creditor need not take an oath that it is not in his possession.

אִי הָכִי, מֵהֵיכָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ? אֶלָּא אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: שֶׁיֵּשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁנִּגְנְבָה. סוֹף סוֹף מֵהֵיכָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ? דְּטָרַח וּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ.

The Gemara asks: If so, the question remains: Why is the obligation to take the oath transferred from the debtor to the creditor? There is no concern that the creditor will produce the collateral. From where will he bring it if it was burned? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is referring to a case where there are witnesses that the collateral was stolen. The Gemara asks: Ultimately, in that case too, from where will the creditor bring the collateral if it was stolen? The Gemara answers: Although the collateral had been stolen, it is possible the creditor will exert himself to locate the thief and bring the collateral, thereby proving that the debtor took a false oath.

אִי הָכִי, כִּי מִשְׁתְּבַע מַלְוֶה נָמֵי, לִטְרַח לֹוֶה וְלַיְתֵי! בִּשְׁלָמָא מַלְוֶה יָדַע מַאן קָא עָיֵיל וְנָפֵק בְּבֵיתֵיהּ, וְאָזֵיל וְטָרַח וּמַיְיתֵי לַהּ. אֶלָּא לֹוֶה, מִי יָדַע מַאן עָיֵיל וְנָפֵיק בְּבֵיתֵיהּ דְּמַלְוֶה?

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case where the creditor takes an oath as well, let the debtor exert himself and bring the collateral, thereby proving that the creditor took a false oath. The Gemara answers: This is unlikely. Granted, there is concern that the creditor will recover the stolen collateral, as he knows who enters and exits his house, so he may have some inkling of the identity of the thief. And therefore, he goes and exerts himself and brings the collateral. But with regard to the debtor, does he know who enters and exits the creditor’s house? He has no inkling who the thief might be.

אַבָּיֵי אוֹמֵר: גְּזֵירָה שֶׁמָּא יִטְעוֹן וְיֹאמַר לוֹ: אַחַר שְׁבוּעָה מְצָאתִיהָ. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְזֶה נִשְׁבָּע, זֶה נִשְׁבָּע שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, וְזֶה נִשְׁבָּע כַּמָּה הָיָה שָׁוֶה. וְהָכִי קָאָמַר: מִי נִשְׁבָּע תְּחִילָּה? מַלְוֶה נִשְׁבָּע תְּחִילָּה, שֶׁמָּא יִשָּׁבַע זֶה וְיוֹצִיא הַלָּה אֶת הַפִּקָּדוֹן.

Abaye says: Although the creditor takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, the obligation to take an oath for partial admission is transferred from the debtor to the creditor, as the Sages issued a decree lest the debtor take the oath for his partial admission and the creditor claim and say to him: I found the collateral after you took the oath. Rav Ashi says: This party, the creditor, takes an oath and that party, the debtor, takes an oath. This party, the creditor, takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession. And that party, the debtor, takes an oath as to how much the collateral was worth. And this is what the mishna is saying: Who takes an oath first? The creditor takes an oath first that the collateral is not in his possession, lest this party, i.e., the debtor, take an oath and the other party, i.e., the creditor, produce the deposit.

רַב הוּנָא בַּר תַּחְלִיפָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא אָמַר: רֵישָׁא דְסֵיפָא תְּיוּבְתָּא לְרַב הוּנָא, סֶלַע הִלְוִיתַנִי עָלָיו, שְׁתַּיִם הָיָה שָׁוֶה. וְהַלָּה אוֹמֵר: לֹא כִי, אֶלָּא סֶלַע הִלְוִיתִיךָ עָלָיו, סֶלַע הָיָה שָׁוֶה – פָּטוּר. וְאִם אִיתָא לִדְרַב הוּנָא מִגּוֹ דְּמִשְׁתְּבַע מַלְוֶה שֶׁאֵינָהּ בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ, לִישְׁתְּבַע נָמֵי אַגִּילְגּוּל שְׁבוּעָה כַּמָּה הָיָה שָׁוֶה!

Rav Huna bar Taḥlifa said in the name of Rava: The first part of the latter clause of the mishna is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rav Huna, who said that the creditor is obligated to take an oath that the collateral is not in his possession. In that clause, the debtor said: You loaned me a sela on the basis of that collateral, and the collateral was worth two sela, so now you owe me a sela. And the other party, i.e., the creditor, said: That is not the case, rather, I loaned you a sela on the basis of that collateral and the collateral was worth a sela. In this case, the creditor is exempt. And if the statement of Rav Huna is so, once the creditor takes an oath that the collateral is not in his possession, let him also take an oath by means of extension of an oath as to how much the collateral was worth, as one obligated to take an oath can be forced to take other oaths as well.

אָמַר רַב אָשֵׁי: אַמְרִיתַהּ לִשְׁמַעְתָּא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב כָּהֲנָא וְאָמַר לִי: תְּהֵא בְּמַאֲמִינוֹ. וּנְהֵמְנֵיהּ לֹוֶה לְמַלְוֶה נָמֵי בְּהָא כַּמָּה הֲוָה שָׁוֶה? לָא קִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ. וּנְהֵמְנֵיהּ מַלְוֶה לְלֹוֶה, דְּקִים לֵיהּ בְּגַוֵּיהּ? לָא מְהֵימַן לֵיהּ.

Rav Ashi said: I stated this halakha before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Let the halakha in the mishna be understood with regard to a case where the debtor trusts the creditor that the collateral is no longer in his possession. The Gemara challenges: But if so, let the debtor trust the creditor with regard to this matter of how much the collateral was worth. The Gemara explains: The creditor is not certain about the value of the collateral, as the item did not belong to him, which is why the debtor does not rely upon him to take an oath concerning its value. The Gemara challenges: But let the creditor trust the debtor, as the debtor is certain about the value of the collateral, as it is his. The Gemara answers: The creditor does not trust the debtor.

וּמַאי שְׁנָא לֹוֶה דִּמְהֵימַן לֵיהּ לְמַלְוֶה, וּמַאי שְׁנָא מַלְוֶה דְּלָא מְהֵימַן לֵיהּ לְלֹוֶה? לֹוֶה מְקַיֵּים בֵּיהּ בְּמַלְוֶה ״תֻּמַּת יְשָׁרִים תַּנְחֵם״, מַלְוֶה מְקַיֵּים בֵּיהּ בְּלֹוֶה ״וְסֶלֶף בּוֹגְדִים יְשָׁדֵּם״.

The Gemara asks: And what is different so that the debtor trusts the creditor that the collateral is not in his possession, and what is different that the creditor does not trust the debtor to accurately assess the value of the collateral? The Gemara answers: The debtor sees in the creditor fulfillment of the verse: “The integrity of the upright shall guide them” (Proverbs 11:3). He believes that God blesses the creditor with wealth to lend because he is an upright person. The creditor sees in the debtor fulfillment of the end of that verse: “But the perverseness of the faithless shall destroy them” (Proverbs 11:3). The creditor believes that God made the debtor poor because he is a deceitful person.

הָהוּא גַּבְרָא דְּאַפְקֵיד כִּיפֵּי גַּבֵּי חַבְרֵיהּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הַב לִי כִּיפַּי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא יָדַעְנָא הֵיכָא אוֹתְבִי[תִי]נְהוּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל לָא יָדַעְנָא פְּשִׁיעוּתָא הִיא, זִיל שַׁלֵּים! לָא שַׁילֵּם. אֲזַל רַב נַחְמָן אַגַּבְּיֵהּ לְאַפַּדְנֵיהּ מִינֵּיהּ, לְסוֹף אִישְׁתְּכֻח כִּיפֵּי וְאִיַּקּוּר. אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: הָדְרִי כִּיפֵּי לְמָרַיְיהוּ. וְהָדְרָא אַפַּדְנָא לְמָרַהּ.

§ The Gemara relates: A certain man deposited jewels [keifei] with another. When the period of the deposit was complete, the owner of the jewels said to the bailee: Give me the jewels. The bailee said to him in response: I do not know where I placed them. The matter came before Rav Naḥman, who said to the bailee: Every circumstance where a bailee claims: I do not know where I placed them, is in and of itself negligence. Go pay him for the jewels. The bailee did not pay. Rav Naḥman went and gave instructions to repossess his palace and sell it to pay for the jewels. Ultimately, not only were the jewels found, but they had also increased in value. Rav Naḥman said: The jewels return to their initial owner, and the palace returns to its owner, and the bailee does not profit from the increase in the value of the jewels.

אָמַר רָבָא: הֲוָה יָתֵיבְנָא קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן, וּפִרְקִין ״הַמַּפְקִיד״ הֲוָה, וַאֲמַרִי לֵיהּ: שִׁילֵּם וְלֹא רָצָה לִישָּׁבַע. וְלָא אַהְדַּר לִי.

Rava said: I was sitting at that time studying before Rav Naḥman, and our chapter of study was this chapter: One who deposits, which is relevant to this case. And I said to Rav Naḥman: Isn’t this the case of a bailee who paid the owner and did not wish to take an oath? And it is the bailee who receives the double payment, ostensibly because once he paid, the owner transfers ownership of the item to him. And Rav Naḥman did not answer me, and he did well that he did not answer me, as the question was not worthy of an answer.

וְשַׁפִּיר עֲבַד דְּלָא אַהְדַּר לִי. מַאי טַעְמָא? הָתָם לָא אַטְרְחֵיהּ לְבֵי דִינָא, הָכָא אַטְרְחֵיהּ לְבֵי דִינָא.

Rava continues: What is the reason he did not answer me? The reason is that the cases cannot be compared. There, in the case of the mishna, the bailee paid at his own initiative. He did not inconvenience the owner by compelling him to go to court. Therefore, the owner transfers ownership of the deposit to the bailee. Here, in the case involving the jewels, the bailee inconvenienced the owner and compelled him to go to court. Consequently, the owner does not transfer ownership of the deposit to the bailee.

לְמֵימְרָא דְּסָבַר רַב נַחְמָן דְּשׁוּמָא הָדַר? שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, דְּשׁוּמָא בְּטָעוּת הֲוָה, (דְּקָא) [דְּהָא] הֲוָה כִּיפֵּי מֵעִיקָּרָא.

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Rav Naḥman holds that after property is repossessed in order to pay an unpaid debt based on the court’s appraisal of the article’s value, it is returned if the debtor pays the debt? The Gemara rejects that conclusion: In general, the item is not returned. But it is different there, in the case of the jewels, as it was an erroneous appraisal, in that the jewels were in the possession of the bailee from the outset and he was merely unable to locate them.

אָמְרִי נְהַרְדָּעֵי: שׁוּמָא הָדַר עַד תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא. וְאָמַר אַמֵּימָר: אֲנָא מִנְּהַרְדְּעָא אֲנָא, וּסְבִירָא לִי שׁוּמָא הָדַר לְעוֹלָם. וְהִלְכְתָא: שׁוּמָא הָדַר לְעוֹלָם, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״וְעָשִׂיתָ הַיָּשָׁר וְהַטּוֹב״.

With regard to the reversal of an appraisal, the Sages of Neharde’a say: After property is repossessed in order to pay an unpaid debt based on the court’s appraisal of the article’s value, it is returned to the debtor, provided he repays the debt from the time of the appraisal until the twelve months of the year have passed. And Ameimar said: I am from Neharde’a, and nevertheless, I hold that repossession based on an appraisal of an article’s value can always be returned. If the debtor pays his debt, he can reclaim his property at any point. The Gemara rules: And the halakha is that repossession based on an appraisal can always be returned, due to the fact that it is stated: “And you shall do that which is right and good” (Deuteronomy 6:18). The owner of property appreciates his property more than another person would. Therefore, once the debtor repays his debt to the creditor, legal formalism should not prevent return of the debtor’s property.

פְּשִׁיטָא: שָׁמוּ לֵיהּ לְבַעַל חוֹב, וַאֲזַל אִיהוּ וְשָׁמַהּ לְבַעַל חוֹב דִּידֵיהּ, אָמְרִינַן לֵיהּ: לָא עֲדִיף אַתְּ מִגַּבְרָא דַּאֲתֵית מִינֵּיהּ. זַבְּנַהּ, אוֹרְתַאּ, וְיַהֲבַהּ בְּמַתָּנָה, וַדַּאי הָנֵי מֵעִיקָּרָא אַדַּעְתָּא דְּאַרְעָא נְחוּת וְלָאו אַדַּעְתָּא דְּזוּזֵי נְחוּת.

§ The Gemara clarifies related matters. It is obvious that if the court appraised property to repay a debt to a creditor, and this creditor went and had the property appraised and repaid his debt to his creditor, we say to the second creditor: Your rights are not superior to those of the man through whom you came to possess the property. Just as the first debtor can repay the debt and reclaim his property from his creditor, he can also reclaim the property from the creditor of his creditor. If a creditor who received appraised land sold it or bequeathed it to his heirs or gave it as a gift, the debtor cannot reclaim the land from those who acquired their land. It is certain that from the outset, when those people acquired the land, it was with the intent to acquire the land itself that they descended to it, and it was not with the intent to receive money that they descended to the land.

שָׁמוּ לַהּ לְאִשָּׁה וְאִינְּסִיבָא, אוֹ שָׁמוּ מִינַּהּ דְּאִשָּׁה וְאִינְּסִיבָא וּמֵתָה בַּעַל בְּנִכְסֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ לוֹקֵחַ הָוֵי – לָא מַיהְדַּר וְלָא מַהְדְּרִינַן לֵיהּ.

If the court appraised property to repay a debt to a woman and she then married, or if the court appraised property from a woman to repay her debt and she then married and died, since the legal status of a husband with regard to his wife’s property is that of a buyer, he does not return property that was appraised and repossessed to pay his wife’s debt. And we do not return to him property that was repossessed from his wife if he pays her debt.

דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר חֲנִינָא: בְּאוּשָׁא הִתְקִינוּ – הָאִשָּׁה שֶׁמָּכְרָה בְּנִכְסֵי מְלוֹג בְּחַיֵּי בַּעְלָהּ וָמֵתָה – הַבַּעַל מוֹצִיא מִיַּד הַלָּקוֹחוֹת.

This is as Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: In Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold part of her usufruct property during the life of her husband and she died, the husband repossesses the property from the purchasers. The property belongs to the wife, while the profits accrued after marriage belong to the husband. Therefore, the woman does not have the right to sell the property as long as they are married. If she sold the property and died, and her husband is her heir, the Sages instituted that his legal status is that of a buyer and not an heir. His rights to the land precede those of the subsequent buyers. He repossesses the land and reimburses them the sale price of the property.