חֲדָא הוּא, דְּחַד טַעַם הוּא, דְּמִשּׁוּם דְּקָאָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר מַחְלוֹקֶת בְּשֶׁאֵין חַיָּיב מוֹדֶה – הוּא מְתָרֵץ הָכִי.

The Gemara answers: It is actually one element, as both elements have the same one reason; because Rabbi Elazar says that the dispute in the mishna is in a case when the liable party does not admit his debt, he explains Rabbi Meir’s opinion in this manner, i.e., that a promissory note that does not include a property guarantee cannot be used to collect the debt even from unsold property.

תְּיוּבְתָּא דִשְׁמוּאֵל בְּתַרְתֵּי: חֲדָא כְּרַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, דְּהָא מוֹקֵי מַתְנִיתִין בְּשֶׁאֵין חַיָּיב מוֹדֶה.

The Gemara elaborates on the statement that the baraita serves as a conclusive refutation of two elements of the opinion of Shmuel: One element is like the element of the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that was refuted, as Shmuel also establishes the dispute in the mishna as referring to a case when the liable party does not admit to the debt, and the baraita states that in such a case there is no dispute.

וַחֲדָא דְּאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מָצָא שְׁטַר הַקְנָאָה בַּשּׁוּק – יַחְזִיר לַבְּעָלִים, וְלָא חָיְישִׁינַן לְפֵרָעוֹן.

And the other one is that which Shmuel says: If one found a deed of transfer in the marketplace, in which it is stipulated that the debtor transfers the rights to his property from the date that the document was signed, he must return it to its owner, and we do not suspect that there was repayment and that there is collusion between the creditor and the debtor.

תְּיוּבְתָּא דְּקָתָנֵי הָכָא: אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשְּׁנֵיהֶם מוֹדִים לֹא יַחְזִיר לֹא לָזֶה וְלֹא לָזֶה, אַלְמָא חָיְישִׁינַן לְפֵרָעוֹן, וְכׇל שֶׁכֵּן הָכָא דְּלָא מוֹדֵה לֹוֶה – דְּחָיְישִׁינַן לְפֵרָעוֹן.

There is a conclusive refutation of that statement as well, as the baraita here teaches: Even if they both agree, he should return it neither to this person nor to that person. Apparently, we suspect that there was repayment. And all the more so here, in the case of a deed of transfer, when the liable party does not admit that he owes money, the deed should certainly not be returned, as we suspect that there was repayment.

אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מַאי טַעְמַיְיהוּ דְּרַבָּנַן? סָבְרִי אַחְרָיוּת טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא.

§ Shmuel said: What is the reason for the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that one can collect a debt from liened property even if the promissory note does not include a property guarantee? They hold that omission of the property guarantee from the promissory note is a scribal error, as one would certainly not lend money without a property guarantee.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא בַּר אִיתַּי לְרַב אִידִי בַּר אָבִין: וּמִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי? וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שֶׁבַח, שֶׁפֶר וְשִׁעְבּוּד – צָרִיךְ לִימָּלֵךְ!

Rava bar Ittai said to Rav Idi bar Avin: Did Shmuel actually say this; i.e., that the omission of this clause is considered a scribal error? But doesn’t Shmuel say that enhancement, superior-quality land, and a lien require consultation? When a scribe writes a deed of sale for a field he must ask the seller whether to write explicitly that if there is a lien on the field, and the field is then is repossessed from the buyer, in which case the seller must compensate the buyer for any enhancement of the value of the field that occurred while it was in his possession, that this compensation will be made from superior-quality land, and that he liens all of his land as security for this sale. This indicates that Shmuel holds that a property guarantee is not written in every promissory note.

לֵימָא מַאן דְּאָמַר הָא לָא אָמַר הָא?

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that the one who says this statement quoting Shmuel does not say that statement quoting Shmuel? Perhaps it is a dispute between the amora’im who transmitted the statements of Shmuel.

לָא קַשְׁיָא: כָּאן בִּשְׁטַר הַלְוָאָה, דְּלָא יָהֵיב אִינָשׁ זוּזֵי בִּכְדִי. כָּאן בְּמִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר, דְּעָבֵיד אִינָשׁ דְּזָבֵין אַרְעָא לְיוֹמֵיהּ.

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. Here, where Shmuel said that the omission of a property guarantee is a scribal error, it was with regard to a promissory note, as a person does not give away his money for nothing. When one lends his money, he requires a property guarantee. There, by contrast, where Shmuel said that a scribe must consult with the seller with regard to writing a property guarantee, it is with regard to a case of buying and selling land, as a person is apt to purchase land for a day. It is conceivable that the buyer is willing to risk that there is a prior lien on the land, thinking that even if he owns the property only for one day he can earn a profit.

כִּי הָהִיא דַּאֲבוּהּ בַּר אִיהִי זְבַין עִלִּיתָא מֵאֲחָתֵיהּ, אֲתָא בַּעַל חוֹב טַרְפַהּ מִינֵּיהּ. אֲתָא לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּמָר שְׁמוּאֵל, אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כְּתַבָה לָךְ אַחְרָיוּת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִם כֵּן, זִיל לִשְׁלָמָא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: וְהָא מָר הוּא דְּאָמַר אַחְרָיוּת טָעוּת סוֹפֵר הוּא! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: הָנֵי מִילֵּי בִּשְׁטָרֵי הַלְוָאָה, אֲבָל בִּשְׁטָרֵי מִקָּח וּמִמְכָּר – לָא, דַּעֲבִיד אִינָשׁ דְּזָבֵין אַרְעָא לְיוֹמֵיהּ.

As evidence of this distinction, the Gemara gives an example: It is like that incident in which Avuh bar Ihi purchased a loft from his sister. Her creditor came and repossessed the loft from him. He came before Mar Shmuel to file a claim against his sister. Shmuel said to him: Did she write you a guarantee in the deed of sale? He said to Shmuel: No. Shmuel said to him: If so, go to peace (see Berakhot 64a), as there is nothing that can be done. He said to Shmuel: But wasn’t it you, Master, who said that omission of the guarantee of the sale from the document is a scribal error? Shmuel said to him: This statement applies only to promissory notes, but with regard to deeds of buying and selling it does not apply, as a person is apt to purchase land for a day.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רְאוּבֵן שֶׁמָּכַר שָׂדֶה לְשִׁמְעוֹן בְּאַחְרָיוּת, וּבָא בַּעַל חוֹב דִּרְאוּבֵן וְקָא טָרֵיף לֵיהּ מִינֵּיהּ, דִּינָא הוּא דְּאָזֵיל רְאוּבֵן וּמִשְׁתַּעֵי דִּינָא בַּהֲדֵיהּ, וְלָא מָצֵי אָמַר לֵיהּ: לָאו בַּעַל דְּבָרִים דִּידִי אַתְּ, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: דְּמַפְּקַתְּ מִינֵּיהּ, עֲלַי דִּידִי הָדַר.

§ Abaye said: Consider the case of Reuven, who sold a field to Shimon with a property guarantee, and Reuven’s creditor came and repossessed the field from Shimon, as he had a prior lien on the property. It is the halakha that Reuven can go and litigate with the creditor, and the creditor cannot say to him: I am not legally answerable to you since I am taking the field from Shimon. This is because Reuven can say to his creditor: That which you take from him comes back to me, as I sold the field to Shimon with a guarantee, so you cannot claim that I am not a legal party in this matter.

אִיכָּא דְּאָמְרִי: אֲפִילּוּ שֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת נָמֵי, דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ: לָא נִיחָא לִי דְּלֶיהְוֵי לְשִׁמְעוֹן תַּרְעוֹמֶת עֲלַי.

There are those who say that Abaye said: Even if Reuven sold the field to Shimon without a property guarantee, Reuven can dispute the legal claim in court, as he can say to the creditor: It is not amenable to me that Shimon would have a grievance against me for selling him property that was subsequently repossessed.

וְאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: רְאוּבֵן שֶׁמָּכַר שָׂדֶה לְשִׁמְעוֹן שֶׁלֹּא בְּאַחְרָיוּת, וְיָצְאוּ עָלֶיהָ עֲסִיקִין, עַד שֶׁלֹּא הֶחְזִיק בָּהּ

And Abaye said: Consider the case of Reuven, who sold a field to Shimon without a property guarantee, and disputants emerged disputing Reuven’s prior ownership of the field. As long as Shimon has not yet taken actual possession of the land,