אֲבָל מְטָא זְמַן חִיּוּבֵיהּ – רָמֵי אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ וּמִידְּכַר.

but when the time of his obligation to pay arrives, he applies himself and remembers all the details, so as not to violate the prohibition of delaying payment of the laborer’s wages.

וְכִי שָׂכִיר עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תִּגְזֹל״? הָתָם תְּרֵי חֲזָקֵי, הָכָא חֲדָא חֲזָקָה. גַּבֵּי בַּעַל הַבַּיִת אִיכָּא תְּרֵי חֲזָקֵי: חֲדָא דְּאֵין בַּעַל הַבַּיִת עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״בַּל תָּלִין״, וַחֲדָא דְּאֵין שָׂכִיר מְשַׁהֶא שְׂכָרוֹ. וְהָכָא חֲדָא חֲזָקָה.

The Gemara asks: Why would one rely upon the presumption that the employer would not transgress? But is the hired laborer suspected of violating the prohibition of stealing? The Gemara replies: There, concerning the credibility of an employer, there are two presumptions, whereas here, concerning the credibility of a laborer, there is only one presumption. The Gemara explains: Concerning the credibility of an employer there are the following two presumptions: One is that the employer does not violate the prohibition of delaying payment of wages, and the other one is that a hired laborer does not delay the request for his wages. But here, concerning the credibility of the laborer, there is only one presumption, i.e., that the laborer does not violate the prohibition of stealing.

אִם יֵשׁ עֵדִים שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ – הֲרֵי זֶה נִשְׁבָּע וְנוֹטֵל. וְהָא (קָתָבְעוֹ לְקַמַּן) [קָא תָבַע לֵיהּ קַמַּן]? אָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי: שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ בִּזְמַנּוֹ. וְדִלְמָא לְבָתַר הָכִי פְּרַע? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: שֶׁתְּבָעוֹ כָּל זְמַנּוֹ.

The mishna teaches: If there are witnesses who testify that he claimed the money from him, he takes an oath and receives the money. The Gemara asks: But what need is there for witnesses that he lodged a claim, when he is claiming it from him in front of us? Rabbi Asi said: The tanna is referring to witnesses that testified that he claimed it from him at its proper time. The Gemara challenges: Even if the laborer claimed the money at the proper time, perhaps the employer paid him afterward. Abaye said: The witnesses testify that he claimed it from him the entire time, i.e., from the time he completed his labor until the end of that day.

וּלְעוֹלָם לָא פָּרַע לֵיהּ?! אָמַר רַב חָמָא בַּר עוּקְבָא: כְּנֶגֶד אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם שֶׁל תְּבִיעָה.

The Gemara continues: And is it always assumed that the employer did not pay the laborer? Why does the fact that he claimed his money at the proper time mean that his claim against his employer is always accepted? Rav Ḥama bar Ukva said: The tanna means that he is given another day corresponding to that day of his claim during which the laborer can claim that he has not been paid.

מַתְנִי׳ הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ – לֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין. וְלֹא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לִיטּוֹל מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד״. הָיוּ לוֹ שְׁנֵי כֵלִים – נוֹטֵל אֶחָד וּמַנִּיחַ אֶחָד.

MISHNA: With regard to one who lends money to another and the debtor fails to repay it at the end of the term of the loan, the creditor may take collateral from him to ensure payment only by means of an agent of the court, not of his own accord. And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral, as it is stated: “When you lend your neighbor any manner of loan, you shall not go into his house to take his collateral. You shall stand outside, and the man to whom you lend shall bring forth the collateral to you outside” (Deuteronomy 24:10–11). If the debtor had two utensils of the same kind, the creditor takes one and leaves the other one in the debtor’s possession.

וּמַחְזִיר אֶת הַכַּר בַּלַּיְלָה וְאֶת הַמַּחְרֵישָׁה בַּיּוֹם. וְאִם מֵת – אֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר לְיוֹרְשָׁיו. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר: אַף לְעַצְמוֹ אֵינוֹ מַחְזִיר אֶלָּא עַד שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם, וּמִשְּׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם וּלְהַלָּן מוֹכְרָן בְּבֵית דִּין.

And in addition, the creditor must return a pillow at night, as the debtor requires it for sleeping, and a plow, which is needed for his daytime work, by day. If the debtor died, he is not required to return it to the debtor’s heirs. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even to the debtor himself he needs to return the collateral each day only until thirty days have passed, and from thirty days onward, the creditor can sell them in court, with the proceeds going toward payment of the debt.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין מְנַתַּח נַתּוֹחֵי – אִין, אֲבָל מַשְׁכּוֹנֵי – לָא. וְהָתְנַן: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין, מִכְּלָל דִּבְבֵית דִּין מְמַשְׁכְּנִין!

GEMARA: Shmuel says: An agent of the court who was granted permission to appropriate items from a debtor up to the sum of the loan may seize these items from him in the marketplace, but is not permitted to enter the debtor’s house and take collateral. The Gemara asks: But didn’t we learn in the mishna that one who lends money to another may take collateral from him only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that when it is taken by means of an agent of the court the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral?

אָמַר לָךְ שְׁמוּאֵל: אֵימָא, לֹא יְנַתְּחֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: לֹא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לִיטּוֹל מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ. מַנִּי? אִילֵּימָא בַּעַל חוֹב – מֵרֵישָׁא שָׁמְעַתְּ מִינַּהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין!

The Gemara responds: Shmuel could have said to you: Say that the mishna meant as follows: He may seize it forcibly from him only by means of an agent of the court. The Gemara adds: So, too, it is reasonable that this is correct, as the latter clause of the mishna teaches: And he may not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral. Who is the tanna referring to here? If we say it is referring to the creditor, this clause is not needed, as this halakha can be concluded from the first clause of the mishna, which states that a creditor has no right to take collateral himself. Rather, is it not referring to the court agent? Accordingly, this teaches that even an agent of the court may not enter the debtor’s house to take the collateral.

אִי מִשּׁוּם הָא – לָא אִירְיָא. הָכִי קָאָמַר: הַמַּלְוֶה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ לֹא יְמַשְׁכְּנֶנּוּ אֶלָּא בְּבֵית דִּין, מִכְּלָל דִּבְבֵית דִּין מְמַשְׁכְּנִים, וּבַעַל חוֹב אֲפִילּוּ נַתּוֹחֵי נָמֵי לָא, שֶׁלֹּא יִכָּנֵס לְבֵיתוֹ לִיטּוֹל מַשְׁכּוֹנוֹ.

The Gemara refutes the above claim: If the argument to understand the mishna in that manner is due to that reason, there is no conclusive argument, as it is possible that this is what the mishna is saying: One who lends money to another may take collateral from him by entering the debtor’s house only by means of an agent of the court, which proves by inference that it is permitted to take collateral by entering the debtor’s house by means of an agent of the court. One can then infer: But as for the creditor himself, he may not even seize collateral outside the debtor’s house. This is a rabbinic decree so that he should not enter the debtor’s house to take his collateral.

מֵתִיב רַב יוֹסֵף: ״לָא יַחֲבֹל רֵיחַיִם וָרָכֶב״, הָא דְּבָרִים אֲחֵרִים – חֲבֹל. ״לֹא תַחֲבֹל בֶּגֶד אַלְמָנָה״, הָא שֶׁל אֲחֵרִים – תַּחְבֹּל, מַאן? אִי נֵימָא בַּעַל חוֹב, הָא כְּתִיב: ״לֹא תָבֹא אֶל בֵּיתוֹ לַעֲבֹט עֲבֹטוֹ״, אֶלָּא לָאו שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין!

Rav Yosef raises an objection to Shmuel’s statement from a baraita: The Torah states: “He may not take the lower or upper millstone as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:6). But it may be inferred that other items may be taken as collateral. Similarly, it states: “You may not take a widow’s garment as collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:17), but clothing that belongs to others you may take as collateral. The Gemara analyzes these statements: Who is permitted to do so? If we say that the creditor may take these items, that cannot be, as it is written: “You shall not go into his house to take his collateral” (Deuteronomy 24:10). Rather, is it not referring to the agent of the court, which indicates that the agent of the court may enter the debtor’s house and take collateral, although the Torah places limits on which item he can take?

תַּרְגְּמַהּ רַב פָּפָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נַחְמָן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ רַב פָּפָּא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב יוֹסֵף: לְעוֹלָם בְּבַעַל חוֹב, וְלַעֲבוֹר עָלָיו בִּשְׁנֵי לָאוִין.

Rav Pappa, son of Rav Naḥman, interpreted the baraita before Rav Yosef; and some say it was Rav Pappa, son of Rav Yosef, who interpreted the baraita before Rav Yosef: Actually, it is referring to a creditor, and the Torah’s additional prohibition against appropriating certain items is given so that he will violate two prohibitions for this action. For example, if he took the lower or upper millstone he violates both the command: “You shall not go into his house,” as well as the more specific prohibition.

תָּא שְׁמַע: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״בַּחוּץ תַּעֲמֹד״ אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁ״הָאִישׁ אֲשֶׁר אַתָּה נוֹשֶׁה בוֹ יוֹצִיא״! אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״וְהָאִישׁ״ – לְרַבּוֹת שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין. מַאי לָאו: שְׁלִיחַ בֵּית דִּין כְּלֹוֶה?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a different baraita that contradicts Shmuel: From the implication of that which is stated: “You shall stand outside,” do I not know that: “And the man to whom you lend shall bring forth outside” (Deuteronomy 24:11)? Rather, why must the verse state the inclusive phrase “And the man to whom you lend shall bring forth outside”? This serves to include the agent of the court. The Gemara comments: What, is it not that the agent of the court has the same status as the debtor himself, indicating that just as the debtor may enter his own house at any time, the court agent may act likewise?