וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְלִפְנֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, וְאָמְרוּ: יַחְלוֹקוּ אֶת חֹדֶשׁ הָעִיבּוּר.

And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The two expressions have contradictory implications, and it is uncertain which expression should be followed. Therefore, the landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them, i.e., the renter should pay half a gold dinar for it.

גְּמָ׳ מַעֲשֶׂה לִסְתּוֹר?! חַסּוֹרֵי מְחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: וְאִם אָמַר לוֹ בִּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר זְהוּבִים לְשָׁנָה מִדִּינַר זָהָב לְחֹדֶשׁ – יַחְלוֹקוּ. וּמַעֲשֶׂה נָמֵי בְּצִיפּוֹרִי בְּאֶחָד שֶׁשָּׂכַר מֶרְחָץ מֵחֲבֵירוֹ בִּשְׁנֵים עָשָׂר זְהוּבִים לְשָׁנָה מִדִּינַר זָהָב לְחֹדֶשׁ, וּבָא מַעֲשֶׂה לִפְנֵי רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל וְלִפְנֵי רַבִּי יוֹסֵי, וְאָמְרוּ: יַחְלוֹקוּ אֶת חֹדֶשׁ הָעִיבּוּר.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Was an incident cited to contradict the mishna’s initial ruling? The Gemara explains: The latter clause is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: But if the landlord said to the renter that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated, the intercalary month should be divided between them. And in addition, an incident like this occurred in Tzippori involving one who rented a bathhouse from another, and they stated that the rent would be: Twelve gold dinars per year, a gold dinar per month, and then the year was intercalated. And this incident came to court before Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and before Rabbi Yosei, and they said: The landlord and the renter should divide the intercalary month between them.

אָמַר רַב: אִי הֲוַאי הָתָם, הֲוָה יָהֵיבְנָא לֵיהּ כּוּלֵּיהּ לְמַשְׂכִּיר.

Rav said: If I had been there, as a judge, I would have given the entire month to the landlord and ruled that the renter must pay for it. Rav understood that the statement defining the rent should be understood based on the final expression used, i.e., a gold dinar per month.

מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן? ״תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן אַחֲרוֹן״!

The Gemara asks: What is Rav teaching us? Could he be teaching that when a statement consists of two expressions with contradictory implications one should attend only to the last statement?

הָא אָמַר רַב חֲדָא זִימְנָא. דְּאָמַר רַב הוּנָא, אָמְרִי בֵּי רַב: ״אִסְתֵּירָא מְאָה מָעֵי״ – מְאָה מָעֵי. ״מְאָה מָעֵי אִסְתֵּירָא״ – אִסְתֵּירָא.

But didn’t Rav already say that one time before, as Rav Huna said with regard to a case in which a seller fixed the price for an item using two different expressions that indicate different amounts and the buyer agreed and took the item: They say in the study hall of Rav that if the seller said: An asteira, one hundred coins, i.e., copper perutot, then the buyer must pay him one hundred coins, despite the fact that an asteira is a coin worth ninety-six perutot. And if the seller said: One hundred coins, an asteira, the buyer must pay him an asteira. It is already apparent from this ruling that Rav holds that one should rule according to the final expression. Why did he restate his opinion with regard to the case of the intercalary month?

אִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: פָּרוֹשֵׁי קָא מְפָרֵשׁ, קָמַשְׁמַע לַן.

The Gemara explains: If Rav’s opinion were known from there, I would say that the second expression is explaining the first, and that is the reason to follow it. But one would still not know the halakha in a case in which the second expression undeniably contradicts the first. Therefore, Rav teaches us that in all cases one acts in accordance with the final expression.

וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: בְּבָא בְּאֶמְצַע חֹדֶשׁ עָסְקִינַן. אֲבָל בָּא בִּתְחִלַּת חֹדֶשׁ – כּוּלֵּיהּ לְמַשְׂכִּיר, בָּא בְּסוֹף חֹדֶשׁ – כּוּלֵּיהּ לְשׂוֹכֵר.

And Shmuel said in explanation of the ruling of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yosei: In the mishna, we are dealing with a case where the landlord came before the court in the middle of the month. Only in that case is the disputed month divided between them. But if he came at the beginning of the month, the entire month’s rent would be awarded to the landlord, and if he came at the end of the month, the entire month’s rent would be awarded to the renter. The reason is that it is uncertain whether or not one always acts in accordance with the final expression, and, consequently, whether the renter must pay for the extra month. With regard to upcoming days of rental, since the landlord has possession of the property, he can demand rent. And with regard to days that have already passed, where the question is whether the renter must pay for them, since he is in possession of his money, he cannot be made to pay. Shmuel does not hold that only the second statement is followed.

מִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל לָא אָמְרִינַן ״תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן אַחֲרוֹן״? וְהָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: כּוֹר בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים אֲנִי מוֹכֵר לָךְ – יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בִּסְאָה אַחֲרוֹנָה! כּוֹר בִּשְׁלֹשִׁים, סְאָה בְּסֶלַע אֲנִי מוֹכֵר לָךְ – רִאשׁוֹן רִאשׁוֹן קָנָה.

The Gemara asks: Did Shmuel actually say that we do not say that one should attend only to the last statement? But don’t Rav and Shmuel both say: If a seller says to a buyer: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, then he can renege on the sale even while transferring to him the last se’a of grain. As a kor is equal to thirty se’a, it is apparent that each se’a is being sold for one sela, but since that breakdown was not made explicit, the sale of the entire kor is considered as a single entity. Until the entire kor has been transferred, the sale does not take effect. If the seller used two expressions: I am selling you a kor of grain for thirty sela, a se’a per sela, then the buyer acquires each of the thirty se’a of grain one by one, immediately upon each being transferred to him, and the seller cannot renege on the sale of any se’a that has taken place. Although the implications of the seller’s two expressions are contradictory, Shmuel rules that one should act in accordance with the final expression.

הָתָם טַעְמָא מַאי – מִשּׁוּם דְּתָפֵיס, הָכָא נָמֵי קָא תָפֵיס.

The Gemara explains: There, in the case of the grain, Shmuel’s ruling was not due to the fact that we attend to the final expression, since it is uncertain whether or not we do. Rather, what is the reason for his ruling? It is due to the fact that the buyer has already taken hold of the grain and consequently has presumptive ownership of it. Here too, in the case of the bathhouse, each party is holding onto the basis of his claim, i.e., the landlord has possession of his property and the renter has possession of his money, and it is only due to this reason that Shmuel rules as he does.

וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: קַרְקַע בְּחֶזְקַת בְּעָלֶיהָ קַיֶּימֶת. מַאי קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן – ״תְּפוֹס לָשׁוֹן אַחֲרוֹן״, הַיְינוּ דְּרַב? אַף עַל גַּב דְּאָפֵיךְ מֵיפָךְ.

And Rav Naḥman said: I would have ruled that since the halakha is that land is always in its owner’s possession, even when rented out, the landlord is entitled to the entire month’s rent. The Gemara asks: What is Rav Naḥman teaching us? Could his ruling be based on saying that one should attend only to the last statement? But then this is identical to the ruling of Rav. The Gemara clarifies: Rav Naḥman’s ruling is unlike Rav’s, as Rav Naḥman would award the extra month to the landlord even where the order of the two expressions is reversed. Rather, as he explained, his ruling is based on the fact the landlord has possession of the property.

בְּעוֹ מִינֵּיהּ מֵרַבִּי יַנַּאי: שׂוֹכֵר אָמַר נָתַתִּי, וּמַשְׂכִּיר אָמַר לֹא נָטַלְתִּי – עַל מִי לְהָבִיא רְאָיָה?

§ The Sages raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yannai: If a renter says to his landlord: I already gave the rental fee to you, and the landlord says: I did not take any payment from you, upon whom is the burden of proof?

אֵימַת? אִי בְּתוֹךְ זְמַנּוֹ – תְּנֵינָא, אִי לְאַחַר זְמַנּוֹ – תְּנֵינָא. דִּתְנַן: מֵת הָאָב בְּתוֹךְ שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁלֹּא נִפְדָּה עַד שֶׁיָּבִיא רְאָיָה שֶׁנִּפְדָּה. לְאַחַר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם – בְּחֶזְקַת שֶׁנִּפְדָּה, עַד שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לוֹ שֶׁלֹּא נִפְדָּה.

The Gemara clarifies the dilemma: When did the renter make his claim? If it was during his rental period, we already learned the halakha in this case and the Sages would not have asked about it. Similarly, if it was after his rental period, we already learned the halakha in that case as well. As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 49a): A father is obligated to redeem his firstborn son after the son is thirty days old by paying five shekels to a priest. If the father died within thirty days of the birth, the son has the presumptive status of being unredeemed, until he brings a proof that he was redeemed. If he died after thirty days, the son has the presumptive status of having been redeemed, until people tell him that he was not redeemed. It is apparent from this mishna that a person is presumed not to pay money before he must, and he is presumed to have paid money once he is required to do so. This logic can be applied to the paying of a rental fee.

לָא צְרִיכָא: בְּיוֹמָא דְּמִשְׁלַם זִמְנֵיהּ. מִי עֲבִיד אִינִישׁ דְּפָרַע בְּיוֹמָא דְּמִשְׁלַם זִמְנֵיהּ, אוֹ לָא?

The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to raise the dilemma in a case where the renter makes his claim on the day on which his rental period is completed. The dilemma is whether a person is apt to pay his debts on the very day on which the period in which to pay them is completed, or he is not.

אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, תְּנֵיתוּהָ:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to them: Also this, you have already learned in a mishna (111a):