מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי – רַבָּנַן הִיא. אֶלָּא אִי אָמְרַתְּ בְּעָשִׁיר וְעָנִי מַחְלוֹקֶת, אֲבָל מֵעָנִי לְעָנִי דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל זָכָה לוֹ, הָא מַנִּי? לָא רַבָּנַן וְלָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר!

whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot acquire an item for another in this manner. But if you say that the dispute is specifically in a case of a rich person and a poor person but in a case where the pe’a was gleaned by a poor person on behalf of a poor person everyone agrees that he acquired it on the latter’s behalf, in accordance with whose opinion is this mishna? It is neither in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis nor in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ, מַתְנִיתִין דְּאָמַר תְּחִילָּה.

Ulla said to Rav Naḥman: The mishna is referring to a case where the one lifting the item said: I intended to acquire the item for myself at the outset; I never had intention to acquire it on behalf of the rider.

הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא, דְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: אִם מִשֶּׁנְּתָנָהּ לוֹ אָמַר אֲנִי זָכִיתִי בָּהּ תְּחִילָּה – לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם. תְּחִילָּה בְּסֵיפָא לְמָה לִי? פְּשִׁיטָא, אַף עַל גַּב דְּלָא אָמַר תְּחִילָּה, תְּחִילָּה קָאָמַר. אֶלָּא לָאו הָא קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן, רֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר ״תְּחִילָּה״.

The Gemara adds: So too, it is reasonable to explain the mishna in this manner, as it teaches in the last clause: But if, after giving it to the one riding the animal he said: I acquired it for myself at the outset, he has said nothing and the rider keeps the item. Why do I need the phrase: At the outset, to be mentioned in the last clause? It is obvious that even if he did not explicitly say: At the outset, he meant that he acquired it at the outset, before he gave it to the rider. Rather, isn’t this phrase mentioned to teach us this: The first clause of the mishna is also referring a case where he said: I intended to acquire it for myself at the outset?

וְאִידַּךְ: תְּנָא סֵיפָא לְגַלּוֹיֵי רֵישָׁא. סֵיפָא, דְּאָמַר תְּחִילָּה. רֵישָׁא, דְּלָא אָמַר תְּחִילָּה.

And the other Sage, Rav Naḥman, is of the opinion that the mishna taught this phrase in the last clause of the mishna in order to shed light on the first clause. The last clause is referring to a case where he said that he acquired the item at the outset in order to indicate that in the first clause, the one who lifts the item acquires it even in a case where he did not say that he acquired it for himself at the outset. In Rav Naḥman’s opinion, the rider does not acquire the item until it is given to him.

רַב נַחְמָן וְרַב חִסְדָּא דְּאָמְרִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – לֹא קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ.

§ The Gemara discusses the opinion of Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda, who both say: In a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person, i.e., the latter, does not acquire ownership of the item.

מַאי טַעְמָא – הָוֵי תּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים, וְהַתּוֹפֵס לְבַעַל חוֹב בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁחָב לַאֲחֵרִים – לֹא קָנָה.

What is the reason for this? The reason is that it is a case of one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others, as the debtor owes money to other creditors as well; and one who seizes assets for a creditor in a situation that will result in a disadvantage for others does not acquire the assets for him. Although a creditor can himself seize the assets as payment for the debt, no one else can take action that will benefit one person at the expense of others. Similarly, since everyone has equal rights to an ownerless item that is found, one person cannot deprive all others of that right on behalf of another person.

אֵיתִיבֵיהּ רָבָא לְרַב נַחְמָן: מְצִיאַת פּוֹעֵל לְעַצְמוֹ.

Rava raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Naḥman from a baraita: The found item of a laborer, i.e., something that he found, belongs to him and not to the employer for whom he is working at that time.

בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים – בִּזְמַן שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ בַּעַל הַבַּיִת ״נַכֵּשׁ עִמִּי הַיּוֹם״, ״עֲדוֹר עִמִּי הַיּוֹם״. אֲבָל אָמַר לוֹ ״עֲשֵׂה עִמִּי מְלָאכָה הַיּוֹם״ – מְצִיאָתוֹ שֶׁל בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא!

In what case is this statement, that the item belongs to the laborer, said? It is said when the employer told the laborer to perform a specific task, e.g., he said to him: Weed for me today, or: Till for me today. Since the employer specified the task that he hired the laborer to perform, the laborer has rights to the item that the laborer found. But if the employer said to the laborer: Work for me today, without specifying the nature of the work, the found item is the employer’s, as finding ownerless items is included within the general category of work. This indicates that a laborer can acquire an item for someone else, which contradicts Rav Naḥman’s principle.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שָׁאנֵי פּוֹעֵל, דְּיָדוֹ כְּיַד בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא.

Rav Naḥman said to him: A laborer is different, as his hand is like the hand of the employer. He is considered his agent while he is working for him.

וְהָאָמַר רַב: פּוֹעֵל יָכוֹל לַחֲזוֹר בּוֹ אֲפִילּוּ בַּחֲצִי הַיּוֹם!

Rava responded: But doesn’t Rav say that a laborer may reconsider and quit his job, even at midday? Evidently, the relationship between the employer and the laborer is structured to the benefit of the laborer.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: כֹּל כַּמָּה דְּלָא הָדַר בֵּיהּ, כְּיַד בַּעַל הַבַּיִת הוּא. כִּי הֲדַר בֵּיהּ, טַעְמָא אַחֲרִינָא הוּא, דִּכְתִיב: ״כִּי לִי בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל עֲבָדִים, עֲבָדַי הֵם״ – וְלֹא עֲבָדִים לַעֲבָדִים.

Rav Naḥman said to him: As long as he does not retract his commitment, his hand is like the employer’s hand. When he does retract his commitment, he is able to do so. But this is not because matters are structured to the benefit of the laborer, but for a different reason, as it is written: “For to Me the children of Israel are slaves; they are My slaves whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt” (Leviticus 25:55), which indicates: They are My slaves, and not slaves of slaves, i.e., of other Jews. Consequently, a Jew can never be enslaved to another Jew with a contract from which he cannot release himself whenever he wishes. Nevertheless, as long as the laborer does not quit the job, he is considered his employer’s agent.

אָמַר רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הַמַּגְבִּיהַּ מְצִיאָה לַחֲבֵירוֹ – קָנָה חֲבֵירוֹ. וְאִם תֹּאמַר מִשְׁנָתֵינוּ, דְּאָמַר ״תְּנָהּ לִי״, וְלָא אָמַר ״זְכָהּ לִי״.

Contrary to the opinion of Rav Naḥman and Rav Ḥisda, Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In a case of one who performs an act of acquisition by lifting a found item on behalf of another, the other person acquires ownership of the item. And if you say that our mishna seems to suggest otherwise, it is referring to a case where the rider says to the pedestrian: Give it to me, but does not say: Acquire it for me. If he says give it to me, the rider acquires the item only when it reaches his possession. If he says acquire it for me, the rider acquires the item as soon as the pedestrian lifts it.

מַתְנִי׳ רָאָה אֶת הַמְּצִיאָה וְנָפַל עָלֶיהָ, וּבָא אַחֵר וְהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ – זֶה שֶׁהֶחְזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה בָּהּ.

MISHNA: If one saw a found item and fell upon it, intending to thereby acquire it, but did not employ one of the formal modes of acquisition, and then another came and seized it, the one who seized it acquired it because he employed one of the formal modes of acquisition.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם אַבָּא כֹּהֵן בַּרְדְּלָא: אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם. [מַאי טַעְמָא] תַּקִּינוּ רַבָּנַן, דְּלָא (אָתֵי) [לֵיתוֹ] לְאִנְּצוֹיֵי. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף פֵּיאָה. אָמַר רָבָא: מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב בַּר אִידִי נְזִיקִין.

GEMARA: Reish Lakish says in the name of Abba Kohen Bardela: The area of four square cubits surrounding a person has the legal status of his courtyard, and it effects acquisition of every ownerless item located there for him, everywhere. What is the reason for this? The Sages instituted this ordinance so that people would not come to quarrel over an item. Abaye said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe’a. Rava said that Rabbi Ya’akov bar Idi raises an objection to this from a mishna in Nezikin.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי, מוֹתֵיב רַבִּי חִיָּיא בַּר יוֹסֵף פֵּיאָה: נָטַל מִקְצָת פֵּיאָה וְזָרַק עַל הַשְּׁאָר – אֵין לוֹ בָּהּ כְּלוּם. נָפַל לוֹ עָלֶיהָ, פֵּרַס טַלִּיתוֹ עָלֶיהָ – מַעֲבִירִין אוֹתוֹ הֵימֶנָּה. וְכֵן בְּעוֹמֶר שִׁכְחָה.

The Gemara elaborates: Abaye said that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef raises an objection to this from a mishna in tractate Pe’a (4:3), which states: If a poor person took some of the pe’a in the field and threw it on the rest of the pe’a in order to acquire it, he has nothing of it. The same is true if he fell upon the pe’a, or if he spread his garment over it; others may remove him or his garment from the pe’a in order to take it for themselves, as he did not acquire it. And the same is true in the case of a forgotten sheaf left for the poor; a poor person cannot acquire it in any of these manners.

וְאִי אָמְרַתְּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת שֶׁל אָדָם קוֹנוֹת לוֹ בְּכׇל מָקוֹם, נִקְנוֹ לֵיהּ אַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת דִּידֵיהּ!

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Yosef continues: And if you say that a person’s area of four square cubits effects acquisition of property for him everywhere, let his area of four square cubits effect acquisition of the pe’a or the forgotten sheaf for him.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן – דְּלָא אֲמַר ״אֶקְנֵי״.

The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where he did not say: I will acquire the pe’a through this action. He performed the action without revealing his intention; therefore, his acquisition is ineffective.

וְאִי תַּקּוּן רַבָּנַן, כִּי לָא אֲמַר מַאי הָוֵי?!

The Gemara asks: But if the Sages instituted an ordinance that the area of four cubits surrounding a person acquires property for him, then even in a case where he did not say: I will acquire the produce, what of it? Shouldn’t he have acquired it even without expressing his intent to do so?

כֵּיוָן דִּנְפַל, גַּלִּי דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּבִנְפִילָה נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי, בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹת לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ דְּנִקְנֵי.

The Gemara answers: This case is different. Since he fell upon it he thereby revealed his intention: That it is satisfactory for him to acquire the produce by falling on it and it is not satisfactory for him to acquire the produce through the ordinance concerning his four square cubits. Since he decided to forgo the mode of acquisition that the Sages instituted, and falling on the produce is not a valid mode of acquisition, he did not acquire the produce.